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INTRODUCTION

The world's oldest international financial organization is the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS).' Despite its age, many
practitioners know little about the BIS. The BIS' relative obscurity
is due primarily to the bank's desire to keep a low profile. This
comment is designed to introduce the reader to the intricate structure
of the BIS, to alert practitioners to the changing role of the BIS in
international finance, and to allay any fears that the BIS is becoming
or has become the world central bank. Part one of this comment
presents the historical development of the BIS.2 Part two explores
the complex framework of the bank and its intricate web of
committees and functions.' Part three comments upon speculation
that the BIS will become the world central bank and whether such
a
4
likely.
or
prudent
either
is
profile
low
departure from the bank's
I.

HISTORY OF THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETLEMENTS

A. Impetus for an InternationalBank
World War I was the primary impetus for the creation of the BIS.
In fact, prior to the BIS' formation, war was the primary impetus of
international lending.5 Although some consideration had been given
to the creation of a central banks' bank prior to the war, 6 no action
was taken until the aftermath of that war presented problems clearly
calling for such a bank.

1. The Bank for International Settlements: A Profile of an International Institution
(BIA/Profile, Basle, Switzerland), June 1991, at 1 [hercinafter A Profile].
2. See infra notes 5-133 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the BIS).
3.
See infra notes 134-200 and accompanying text (discussing the modem framework and
functions of the BIS).
4. See infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (discussing the future posture of the BIS).
5.
Walker F. Todd, A Brief History of InternationalLending, from a Regional Banker's
Perspective, 11 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1989).
6. A Profile,supra note 1, at 1.
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Before World War I, the world economy applied the gold
standard to convert currency.7 However, the outbreak of the war
caused such widespread disruption of trade and finance that many in
the world financial community found themselves unable to convert
their currencies into gold.' As a result, the international community
was no longer able to rely on the gold standard. 9 Additional
complications arose because the Western Allies had amassed a
considerable amount of debt to the United States,1" and the system
of German reparations payments had broken down.1'
The BIS was formed pursuant to an agreement at The Hague
Conference on January 20, 1930 (Convention respecting the BIS).' 2
The Constituent Charter, the instrument founding the BIS, was signed
in Rome on February 27, 1930. That Charter named Belgium, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,"3 and [a] financial institution
of the United States" as founders of the bank. "4The Bank was
chartered in Switzerland 5 and, since its creation, has been located
in Basle.16
The Bank's stated objectives were: "to promote the cooperation
of central banks and to provide additional facilities for international

7.
FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
690 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the operation of the pre-World War I gold standard); see DWVIGHT M.
JAFFEE, MONEY, BANKING AND CREDIT 550 (1989) (providing a discussion of the rules governing
the pre-World War I gold standard).
8. MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 691.
9. Id. at 692-93.
10. Todd, supra note 5, at 14 (stating that the debt owed the United States was about $10
billion).
11.
d. at 16.
12. A Profile,supra note 1, at 1; See Todd, supra note 5, at 16 (suggesting that the BIS was
the joint brainchild of Reichsbank Chancellor Hjalnar Schaeht and the director of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Owen D. Young).
13. See Bankfor InternationalSettlements; Flexible Mystique, ECONOMIST, June 17, 1989, at
95 (noting that Japan was ousted from the BIS board after the second world war) [hereinafter Flexible
Mystique].
14. Constituent Charter of the Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930, reprintedin
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETr.EMENTs, BASIC TEXTS 7 (1989 reprint) (1987) [hereinafter
Constituent Charteri.
15. Mario Giovanoli, The Role of the Bank for InternationalSettlements in International
Monetary Cooperationand Its Tasks Relating to the European Currency Unit, 23 INT'L LAw. 841
at 846 (1989).
16. Flexible Mystique, supra note 13, at 94. It should be noted that -Basle" is generally
considered the proper spelling but, one often encounters "Basel" in English.

The TransnationalLawyer/Vol. 5
financial operations,"' 17 such as German war reparations payments.
However, the promise of overseeing reparations payments was shortlived as these payments ceased some fourteen months after the BIS
was formed. 8
The world-wide depression and World War II diminished the
already minor role the BIS played in international banking.' 9 Thus,
it was not until post-war reconstruction that the BIS emerged as a
noteworthy entity.2
B. The BIS under the Bretton Woods System
Since it was clear that World War II would leave Europe in a
state of political instability and economic bankruptcy, 2 ' the Western
Allies met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire during the last year of
World War II to form an international payments system for the postwar world.22 Europe's political and economic prosperity depended
upon mutual cooperation towards its economic, social, and political
development.2 3 However, the fact that Europe's individual
currencies were not fully convertible with one another hindered
monetary coordination. 24 The central banks were faced with an
immediate need to restore currency convertibility and decided on a
solution based on fixed exchange rates.25

17.

Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930 (text as amended on July

8, 1975), reprinted in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLE.NTS, BASIC TEXTS 11, (1989 reprint)

(1987) [hereinafter Statutes of the BIS].
18. Todd, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that U.S. bankers and bond investors lent $2.5 billion
to Germany from 1924-31 to aid Germany in meeting its reparation obligations).
19. Id.
20. Id; Cf. A Profile, supra note 1, at 3 (noting the BIS' important role in intra-European
arrangements from 1947-1958).
21. John H. Works, Jr., The European Currency Unit: The Increasing Significance of the
European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41 Bus. LAw. 483, 485 (1985); J. J. Norton &
Carolyn E. Hausen, Reflections Upon Economic and Monetary Union in the EuropeanCommunity,
11 TEx. INT'L LJ. 251, 252 (1976).
22. JAFFEE, supra note 7, at 551.
23. Works, supra note 21, at 485 (commenting that Western Europe's future depended on an
ability to develop "common bases toward a solution"); Norton & Hansen, supra note 21, at 252
(noting that many Europeans believed that the problem was common throughout Europe and should
be solved by "European" means).
24. Works, supra note 21, at 485.
25. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 853.
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The Bretton Woods System 26 introduced a fixed currency
scheme indexed in U.S. dollars which were valued at $35 per ounce
of gold.' Hence, during the period of the Bretton Woods System,
all currencies were fixed in terms of the U.S. dollar.2"
To foster mutual cooperation towards Europe's economic, social,
and political development and to ensure that Europe's individual
currencies were fully convertible with one another, the Bretton
Woods Agreement created three important financial institutions: (1)
The International Monetary Fund (MF); (2) the World Bank; and (3)
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 29 The close
relationship BIS has had with the former two organizations deserves
discussion because these relationships support an argument that the
BIS may become the world central bank.
1. The BIS' Relationship with the IMF
Hailed by some as a marker for the beginning of a new era of
worldwide monetary stability, 30 the IMF was designed to bring
stability to a war-torn world, to promote world trade, and to speed up
the world economic recovery. 3 ' One of the original tasks of the IMF
was to set fixed exchange rates among foreign currencies.32 All rates
of exchange were keyed to the U.S. dollar.33
In order to carry out its function, the IMF sold reserves for those
countries which had a surplus balance of payments and lent reserves

26. Act July 31, 1945 ch. 339,59 stat. 512. The agreements are also codified under Title 22
United States Code § 286b et. seq.
27. JAFFEF, supra note 7, at 551.
28. MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 692.
29. JAFPEE, supra note 7, at 552 (discussing the fact that GATT and the World Bank were two
important components to the Bretton Woods Agreement); MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 692
(commenting on the creation of IMF and its role under Bretton Woods). "'GATT was designed to
provide reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."' JAFFE , supra
note 7, at 552.
30. See Works, supra note 21, at 485 citing The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, negotiated July 1-22, 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Dec. 27, 1945,
amended July 28, 1969, & Apr. 1, 1978).
31. MISHKIN,supra note 7, at 692.
32. JAFFEE, supra note 7, at 551.
33. Id.
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to countries which had a deficit balance of payments. 34 If a
participating nation experienced a continued deficit, 35 the IMF
would devalue the currency of that country. 6
By working together at various levels, the IMF and the BIS
continue to facilitate monetary cooperation.37 In 1974, the BIS
became the first non-member institution to be granted Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs), the currency unit of the IMF.38 The IMF
deposits SDRs 3 9 into the BIS and the BIS extends credit to the

IMF.40 The BIS observes both the work of the Interim Committee
for the Board of Governors of the IMF on the International Monetary
System, and meetings of the Finance Ministers and the central bank
Governors of the Group of Ten (G- 10) countries 4 ' and their
deputies.42
Despite their similar roles in monetary cooperation,43there are
five key differences between the IMF and the BIS: (1) The IMF
44
involves governments whereas the BIS involves Central Banks;
(2) the BIS approach is "pragmatic" whereas the IMF approach is
institutional;45 (3) financial assistance provided by the BIS is in
accordance with generally accepted banking principles whereas the
IMF concerns itself with conditions tied to economic and monetary

34. MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 692-93.
35. Since 1970, the deficit or surplus amounts are measured in terms of Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) Id. at 697 (noting SDRs operate as a paper substitute for gold).
36. Id. at 692 (explaining that this doctrine was known as fundamental disequilibrium). See
JAFFEF, supra note 7, at 551-52 (providing a discussion of the workings of the equilibrium system).
37. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 843. See notes 75-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Fonds Europdende CoopdrationMondtaire(FECOM) and its relationship to the BIS and noting that
FECOM is also in the field of monetary cooperation).
38. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 842.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The G-10 countries are: United Slates, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Japan.
42. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 842.
43. Id. (noting that the BIS and the IMF are joined by other Bretton Woods institutions, and
of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in the field of monetary cooperation, who also
serve differing functions).
44. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 842-43.
45. Id. at 842-43. But see infra notes 110-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Basle
Supervisory Committee which as an extension of the BIS has in effect attempted to impact standards
for international banking).
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policy; 4 6 (4) the IMF is strictly an international organization
whereas the BIS is a bank, holding 10-15% of the worlds monetary
reserves; 47 and (5) the IMF is essentially global in membership, as
opposed to the BIS membership, which is composed of only the

central banks of leading industrial countries. 48 Additionally, the
IMF's currency unit is the SDR while the unit of measure for the BIS
is the gold franc.49
Although criticized as one of the Bretton Woods institutions
which has outlived its usefulness, the IMF has demonstrated a
capacity to respond effectively to the changing needs of the world
economy.5" Currently, the IMF cooperates with GATT and the
BIS. 5521 In 1981 and 1984, the BIS provided financial facilities to the
ImF.

2. The BIS' Relationship with the World Bank
The World Bank, also known as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development," was established under the
Bretton Woods Agreement to facilitate the postwar redevelopment of
Europe.54 It was essentially this agreement that rejuvenated the
BIS. 5 Beginning in 1947, the BIS became instrumental in

46. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 842-43.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The gold franc is equivalent to 0.29032258 grams fine gold. Statutes of the BIS, supra
note 17, at 11 n.2. The gold franc is also known as the franc germinal of 1803, the franc of the Latin
Monetary Union (1865-1926), and the pre-1936 Swiss franc.
50. Nicholas Brady, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks before the Bretton Woods
Committee 1991 Annual Meeting (July 10, 1991) in IMF Survey, July 29, 1991, at 239 [hereinafter
Brady Remarks].
51. Fact Sheet: InternationalMonetary Fund, U.S. DEPT. OF ST. DISPATCH, July 22, 1991,
at 1.
52. A Profile, supra note 1, at 7.
53. JAFEE, supra note 7, at 552.
54. Id. But see Todd, supra note 5, at 16 (criticizing the IMF's international loans format as
typically resulting in uncollectible debt which is harmful to economic development).
55. Interestingly, the Bretton Woods Agreement called for the elimination of the BIS. Flexible
Mystique, supra note 13, at 94 (pointing out that the United States wanted to close the BIS and a
resolution was passed at the -Bretton Woods conferences in July 1944... to do just that."). Even
without such a resolution, BIS reduced operations before World War II, because of the Great
Depression of the thirties and without its new role with the World Bank might have closed its doors
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establishing and operating various intra-European payment
arrangements, most of which were created under the redevelopment
scheme of the World Bank.56 In particular, the BIS assisted in the
European Payments Union from 1950 to 1958; the BIS was the
Depository for loans issued by the European Coal and Steel
Community between 1954 and 1961; and the BIS assisted with the
European Monetary Agreement (EMA) from 1958 to 1972. 57
During the past two decades, the BIS has worked with the World
Bank in an informational capacity by offering statistics and assisting
the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Corporation and
Development (OECD), and the IMF in creating a publication on
external debt.58 The BIS interacts with the OECD primarily in terms
of publication, information exchange, and discussions regarding the
international financial markets. 59 In conjunction with the OECD, the
BIS publishes semi-annual reports on foreign debt which includes
trade-related nonbank credits, as well as lending information.' The
BIS has been collecting and distributing statistical data, concerning
the financing of external surpluses and deficits of the G- 10 countries,
to the OECD since 1964.61
C. Interactionwith the EEC Central Banks
An overview of the BIS-European banking relationship is
essential to understanding the views of those who believe the BIS
will become the world central bank. For obvious reasons, there is a
substantial rapport between the BIS and the banks of the EEC. Thus,
it is helpful to become familiar with several European organizations

in any event. Id.
56. A Profile, supra note 1, at 3; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 853.
57. A Profile, supra note 1, at 8.
58. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844-45. See Economic Developments and International
Finance; Economic Briefs, 58 BNA BANKING REP. 327 (1992) (noting that IMF membership is a
prerequisite to World Bank membership). Thus, the discussion regarding the relationship between the
BIS and the IMF is also relevant as to the discussion regarding the World Bank discussion;
Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 856 (commenting on a recent joint report on external debt statistics).
59. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 853.
60. Id. at 856.
61. Id.
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and their relationships with the BIS to understand the future posture
of these institutions as they move towards regulatory convergence.62
The current efforts of the European banking community may be
traced to the Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1958.63 Pursuant to the Treaty, several
Financial Committees were formed, the foremost of which was the
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member
States.6 4 The Committee of Governors was created to adopt
procedures and compulsory consultations prior to exchange-rate
changes and to refer questions of common interest on international
monetary relations to the Monetary Committee.65
The BIS has hosted the Secretariat of the Committee of
Governors of the Central Banks of the EEC Member States since
1964.66 The importance of the Committee has grown since the
implementation of the European Monetary System (EMS) 67 in
March of 1979.68 Recently, the BIS restructured to accommodate its
expanding duties 69 by establishing three sub-committees: The

62. Sydney J. Key, Mutual Recognition:Integration of the FinancialSector in the European
Community, 75 FED. RESERVE BuLL 591 (1989).
63. Treaty of Rome/Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 537 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
64. Works, supranote 21, at 485. Articles 103 through 108 constitute the framework through
which several Financial Committees were formed. Id. Article 105 created the Consultive Monetary
Committee. Acting under Article 107, tie Consultive Monetary Committee created the Committee
on Short-Term Economic Policy in 1960, and the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of
the Member States on May 8, 1964. Id. at 485-86. The Consultive Monetary Committee set out to
form an Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) but, economic and political conditions prevented the
EMU from achieving greater coordination of economic policies and monetary integration. Id.at 48788.
65. Id. at 488; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 854.
66. A Profile, supra note 1, at 5.
67. The EMS replaced the failing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Works, supra note
21, at 485. The EMU was to occur in three stages: Stage one (from 1970-71) fluctuations among
EEC currencies would be reduced and co-ordination of economic policy would start; stage two (from
1972-75) limited fluctuation to one percent and taxes harmonized; and stage three (1976-78) EEC
central bank and central reserves would be created, tax frontiers would be removed and parities would
become totally locked. Id at 484-85. In short, the EMU began to fail within months and never
proceeded to stage two. Id. at 485.
68. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 854.
69. One of the tasks of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks is to gather
information for the Monetary Committee. A Profile,supra note I, at 4. For instance, the BIS set up
a Euro-currency Standing Committee in 1971. Several issues regarding European currency developed
during this time: (1) placement of central banks' reserves in the market (1971); (2) apparent lack of
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Foreign Exchange Policy Sub-Committee, the Monetary Policy SubCommittee, and the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee.7 °
As the Bretton Woods system was breaking down, 71 and in
response to the United States' abandonment of the gold standard, the
Smithsonian Agreement by the IMF, in December 1971, provided for
temporary suspension of stated par values for the currencies of the
respective European states and provided that each nation could
instead declare central rates for their currencies. 2 For its part, the
BIS played host to the European community in currency exchange
discussions which resulted in the Basle Agreement of April 24, 1972.
This Agreement created what has been called the "snake," or "snake
in the tunnel," to provide narrower currency fluctuations between
member states. 73 The snake was developed as an effort to provide
greater currency stability and to encourage intra-European trade. 74
In 1973, the EEC created the Fonds Europden de Coopdration
Mondtaire (FECOM), 75 known in English as the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), and subsequently established
lines of credit and rules for the settlement of debts among
participating countries.76 FECOM set forth the obligation of
participating countries to coordinate their economic policies to the

a lender of last resort in the Euro-market (1974); (3) implications of the debt problem for the
international credit system (early to mid 1980's). As a result, in April of 1986, the BIS published a
comprehensive report on Recent Innovations in International Banking known as the Cross Report,
prepared by a study group working in the context of the Euro-currency Standing Committee.
Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 855 (remarking that the report was so named because Sam Cross of the
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) of New York was the study group chairman).
70. A Profile, supra note 1, at 5.
71. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances of the Bretton
Woods System's collapse).
72. Works, supra note 21, at 488 (citing E.B. Decision No. 3463 (126/71) (Dec. 18, 1971),
in Selected Decisions of the I.M.F. 14).
73. Id. at 489. "if the exchange rates between each ...currency and the U.S. dollar were
charted over time and the charts superimposed, the image of a snake would appear. The exchange
rates among the snake currencies would fluctuate within the 21/4% band to form its body while the
body would squirm up and down over time in relation to the 412% band of the dollar to form the
tunnel." Id. n.28.
74. JAFFEE, supra note 7, at 553.
75. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 860-61; see generally Works, supra note 21, at 497-98 (providing a general
discussion of FECOM).
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extent necessary for a smooth function of these arrangements. 77
FECOM is a regional institution organized by the European
Economic Community 8 and a catalyst in creating a European
economic and monetary union with a single currency and a European
central bank.7 9
FECOM originally created thesnake8 0 as a chain of fixed
exchange rates to encourage intra-European trade.8 ' However, by
1979 the snake had exceeded its usefulness and was superseded by
the EMS. 2 Under the EMS, fixed but adjustable exchange rates
apply between member states.8 3 The advent of the EMS brought
about cooperation
between the BIS, the Committee of Governors, and
4
FECOM1

The EMS created the European Currency Unit (ECU).8 5 The BIS
administers the borrowing and lending operations adopted by the
Community.86 In other words, the BIS currently acts as clearing
agent for the ECU under the EMS. 7 The BIS has held the private
ECU settlement and clearing function since 1986.8

77. Works, supra note 21, at 489.
78. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844.
79. Id.
80. SeeA Slow Wriggle, EcONoMtsT, July 15,1978, at51 (noting that the Snake was launched
in April 1972) (hereinafter Slow Wriggle]. Even though Britain, along with Denmark, joined soon
after the launching of the Snake, it withdrew several months later, and by July of 1978 only Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg & Denmark remained members. Id.
81. JAFFEE, supra note 7, at 553.
82. Works, supra note 21, at 483 (commenting that the 1979 enactment of the EMS has been
argued to be one of the most outstanding events in the EEC's history; and that the principal objective
of the EMS is to promote harmonization and integration of the economies of the member states
through exchange-rate stability vis-a-vis the joint management of exchange rates); Giovanoli, supra
note 15, at 860.
83. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 854.
84. A Profile, supra note 1, at 5.
85. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 858 (stating that the ECU is the successor to several prior
methods of accounting for the European Communities which is analogous to the SDRs measurement
used by the IMF) (citations omitted). See Works, supra note 21, at 484 (reporting that some have
suggested that the ECU could soon become a rival to the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen as a
vehicle for international credit and finance).
86. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 861 (noting that the BIS administers the ECU in accordance
with the Regulations adopted by the Council of the EEC in February 1975 and March 1981).
87. Geert Linnebank, EMS Approaches 5th Anniversary Hailed as Success but Amid Some
Disappointment,Reuters, Mar. 9, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters.
88. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 858. Cf Linnebank, supra note 87 (noting that the BIS
accepted the private clearing function only after considerable debate).
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Measures taken in July of 1985 provide that ECUs may be used
as swap collateral for intervention purposes.8 9 Additionally, the
central banks of non-EEC countries may now hold ECUs.90 The BIS
is among several international monetary institutions that may hold
official ECUs,9 1 again demonstrating its unique posture among
international banking institutions.
In summary, the BIS is extensively involved with the EEC
Central Banks. The BIS: (1) Acts as Secretariat of the Board of
Governors; 92 (2) acts as FECOM's agent; 93 and (3) performs the
principal function of FECOM, which is the settling of debts among
the central banks of member states.94 Considering these roles, it is
not difficult to envision the BIS as the central bank of the European
community.
D. The BIS' Role in Banking Stability
The Bretton Woods System set the stage for speculation and
futures trading in foreign currencies.9 5 The BIS played a crucial role
in countering the instability in the financial markets which resulted
from speculation by: (1) Playing a key role in coordinating swap
arrangements between U.S. monetary authorities and a number of
central banks to reinforce confidence in the dollar and to provide
emergency short-term liquidity to the system; 96 (2) from 1960 to

89. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 860.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. A Profile, supra note 1, at 5; See infra notes 186, 189 and accompanying text (expanding
on the BIS' role as secretariat).
93, See infra notes 196, 197 and accompanying text (discussing FECOM and its relationship
to the BIS).
94. Slow Wriggle, supra note 80, at 51.
95. MISHKIN supra note 7, at 693-94 (using the term "speculative attack"to describe the trends
of selling weak currency and buying strong currency which hastened changes in currency rates). The
"speculative attack" which occurred in November of 1967 with the devaluation of the British pound
is highlighted as an example. Id. at 693-95.
96. A Profile, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that the origins of these swaps began in 1962 within
the framework of the BIS); Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 854 (discussing the network of swap
arrangements and its origins in 1962 within the BIS' framework). But see Henry T. D. Hu, Swaps,
the Modem Process of FinancialInnovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138
U. PA. L. REV.333, 363 (1989) (suggesting that such swaps were first introduced secretly in the late
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1971, influencing monetary policy relating to currency valuation;9 7
(3) between 1961 and 1968, assisting the G-10 central banks'
intervention and stabilization of the world gold markets;98 and (4)
making liquid resources available to central banks in the form of
credits, stand-by credits, marketable securities, swaps against
gold,9 9 and guarantees.' 0 0 However, by 1971, the Bretton Woods

fixed-rate system collapsed in the face of recurrent waves of
speculation against a number of different currencies. The early swap

arrangements were simply too few or inadequate for the task. Thus,
the Bretton Woods System collapsed by May of 1971 due primarily
to the system's inadequate method of compensating for massive sales
of weak currency and massive purchases of strong currencies.'
The collapse of the Bretton Woods System did not abrogate the
Bretton Woods Agreement.0 2 The method of indexing currencies
to gold, and the U.S. dollar, changed to a floating exchange rate
system. 03 Despite conversion to a floating system, the BIS
maintained a gold pool until 1986, ensuring that prices on private
markets corresponded to official gold prices according to the
directives issued by the Governors of G- 10 central banks. 104
However, during the post Bretton Woods era the actions of the BIS
can be characterized as reactive rather than preventative
measures. 105

1970's) Professor Hu notes that the timing of the first swap is disputed. Id. n.73. Professor Hus
article provides a detailed discussion of the nature and uses of swap arrangements. Id. at 363-66. The
article details how swaps have developed into a complex financial tool in world markets. Id. at 365.
On completing his analysis, Professor Hu concludes that current regulation of swaps under the 1988
Basle Accord is inadequate. Id. at 388.
97. A Profile, supra note 1, at 3.
98. Id. (noting that the G-10 countries "co-ordinated their interventions in the gold markets
through the so-called gold pool").
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing swaps against gold).
100. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 852.
101. MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 693.
102. Brady Remarks, supra note 50, at 239. The Bretton Woods Committee continues to meet
on an annual basis and despite continued criticism that the Agreement has outlived its usefulness,
appears to occupy a permanent position in world financial affairs. Id.
103. MISHKIN, supra note 7, at 697-98; JAFFEE, supra note 7, at 555-56.
104. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 853-54.
105. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text (discussing several financial disasters and
the corresponding reactions by the BIS).
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The shift to floating exchange rates in March of 1973 highlighted
the need for coordination among central banks of major trading
countries, and for regular exchanges of information about the
exchange markets and about central banks' interventions in those
markets."0 6 The BIS membership was concerned with potentially
damaging fluctuations in exchange rates. 107 Furthermore, the
internationalization of financial markets, particularly in the seventies
and eighties, called for a greater degree of cooperation between the
central banks.'08 To cope with these needs, the BIS established a
Standing Committee of the G-10 central banks (G-10 Standing
Committee).'0 9 The G-10 Standing Committee meets regularly to
address current issues in international banking. Its actions, including
the formation of various committees, and the adoption of statements,
concordats, and accords, raises the question of whether the BIS is a
de facto world central bank.
E. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
The early seventies were marked by considerable financial
instability and tremendous growth in international banking. 0 The
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System was perhaps a by-product
of increased international trade, and a forewarning of financial
troubles to come. In 1974, the largest bank in Germany, Bankhaus
11
Herstatt, collapsed due primarily to its international operations.

106. A Profile, supra note 1, at 4.
107. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 854.
108. See, MISHKIN, supra note 7, at xii-xiii; A Profile,supra note 1, at 4 (citing need for deeper
cooperation and understanding among central banks). See generally Todd, supra note 5 (providing
a detailed historical view of the financial difficulties of the "70's and '80's).
109. A Profile, supra note 1, at 4.
110. Todd, supra note 5, at 21-29.
111. Ulich Hess, The BancoAinbrosiano Collapseand the Luxury of NationalLenders of Last
Resortwith InternationalResponsibilities,22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 181, 186-87 nn.18-20 (1990)
(commenting that the Herstatt affair resulted in large part from fraudulent bookkeeping as well as
speculation in foreign currency).
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Later in 1974, Franklin National Bank failed due primarily to its
inability to adapt to changing international markets." 2
Before December 1974, there was no international organization
to coordinate international banking regulation."' In response to this
void, and to the failures of Bankhaus Herstatt, Hessische Landesbank
Girozentrale, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, and Franklin
National, the central bank governors of the G-10 countries and
Switzerland established the Basle Committee
on Banking
5
4
Supervision (Committee)" at the close of 1974.1

112. Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the
InternationalArena, 13 B.C. INV'L & COMp. L. REv. 273, 355-57 nn. 320-22, 324 (1990). Hess,
supra note 111, at 186-87 nn.18-20.
113. Cane & Barclay, supra note 112, at 355-56 nn. 320-21.
114. At the outset of this discussion it should be noted that in theory the BIS is distinct from
the Committee (except for the fact that the BIS acts as secretariat to the Committee). Id. at 355.
However, the members of the Committee, with the exception of the representatives of Canada,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden, are identical to the charter members of the BIS. Compare
supra note 13 and accompanying text with infra note 115 (giving founder nations of the BIS and
member nations of the Committee).
115. Cane & Barclay, supra note 112, at 355-56 (indicating that the creation of the Committee
was a response to the fact that the primary cause of bank failure was due to international banking
operations); A Profile, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the Secretariat of the Committee is provided
by the BIS). The name of the Committee has changed to the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision and is often referred to as the Cooke Committee, named after its former chairman, Peter
Cooke of the Bank of England. Cane & Barclay, supra note 112, at 355-56 n.322. See, Hess, supra
note 111, at 186-87 nn.18-20 (discussing the Herstatt affair as prompting the establishment of the
Committee).
The Committee consists of:
Country
Representative Organization
Belgium
National Bank of Belgium
Banking commission
Canada
Bank of Canada
Office of the Inspector General of Banks
France
Bank of France
Banking Commission
Germany
Deutsche Bundesbank
Federal Banking Supervisory Office
Italy
Bank of Italy
Japan
Bank of Japan
Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg
Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands
The Netherlands Bank
Sweden
Svcriges Riksbank
Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate
Switzerland
Swiss National Bank
Swiss Federal Banking Commission
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The theory behind the formation of the Committee was to provide
banking authorities of the major industrialized nations a regular
forum for cooperative discussion and common efforts in the
prudential supervision area." 6 During 1975 the Committee
promulgated its first set of supervisory guidelines, often referred to
as the original Basle Concordat. 117 The Committee's efforts were
aimed at initiating a steady progression in international supervisory
practices to achieve a standard model. 1 ' The Committee adopted
a very low profile and the 1975 Concordat was not intended to have
a significant legal impact."19
Although the 1975 Concordat managed to keep a low profile, 2 '
it became a legally significant document since it formed guidelines
for the international banking community. '' The Concordat's first
test came in the summer of 1982 when the largest bank in Italy,
Banco Ambrosiano, collapsed and defaulted on loans from 250 of the
world's leading banks. 2 2 The international banking community
became critical of the Concordat and by the spring of 1983, efforts at

U.K.
United States

Bank of England
Federal Reserve Board
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Secretariat
Bank for International Settlements
Joseph Jude Norton, CapitalAdequacy Standard:A Legitimate Regulatory Concernfor Prudential
Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 1299, 1301 n.7; Cane & Barclay, supra note
112, at 355-56 n.323.
116. Norton, supra note 115, at 1301 n.6.
117. Revised Basle Concordat on Bank Oversight, revised May 1983, 41 WASH. FIN. RPTS.
(BNA) 88 (1983) [hereinafter Revised ConcordatJ. "The first public appearance of the 1975
Concordat was as an annex entitled Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, in [sic] R.
Williams, International Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects 29-32 (IMF
Occasional Paper No. 7, 1981)." Norton, supra note 115, at 1337 n.198.
118. Norton, supra note 115, at 1336-37.
119. Id. at 1337 n.198, 1338 (noting that the 1975 Concordat was not publicized outside of the
banking community until 1981 and not widely distributed until 1983).
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Concordat's low profile).
121. Id. at 1337 (expressing view that Concordats were implemented to lend legitimacy to
potentially questionable extensions of jurisdiction by either parent or host countries' banking
authorities over nondomestic entities or subject matter).
122. Duncan Campbell-Smith & William Hall, Anibrosiano Concern Grows, LONDON FIN.
TMEs, July 17, 1982, at II. Hess, supra note 11, at 181.
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a revision were in motion.123 Completed in May of 1983,14 the
revised Concordat represented an additional effort by the Committee
to coordinate international bank supervision. 12' The original
Concordat disappointed some in the international banking community
because it failed to consider issues regarding lenders of last resort
(LLR).

126

In December of 1987, the Committee began work on what would

become the Basle Accord. 27
' The purpose of the Accord was to
develop an international risk-based capital framework. 128 The

123. Hess, supra note 111, at 199.
124. Revised Concordat,supra note 117, at 91.
125. Peter Montagnon, Central Banks Try to Close the Loopholes; New Basle Concordat,
LONDON FIN. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1983, at IVI; Revised Concordat,supra note 117, at 88-89.
The 1983 Concordat modified the 1975 Concordat in several respects generally offering a "dual
key" approach to the supervision of subsidiaries:
(1) Parent authorities are responsible to monitor the solvency of foreign branches, but
the host authority is generally responsible to monitor their financial soundness; thus,
supervision of foreign subsidiaries of international banks is the joint responsibility of both
the host and the parent authorities;
(2) The country where the joint venture or consortium bank is located is responsible to
supervise its solvency, but the parent is obligated to examine the commitments made to
these banks by their shareholders;
(3) Host authorities are responsible to monitor the liquidity of branches, subsidiaries and
joint ventures in consultation with parent authorities vis-a-vis a general responsibility to
oversee liquidity control systems employed by banking groups;
(4) The parent authority is responsible to supervise its bank holding companies'
subsidiaries and ensure that the subsidiary is being adequately supervised, or otherwise
prevent the operation of the subsidiary;
(5) The Parent and host authorities have dual responsibility for supervising their bank's
foreign exchange operations and positions.
Montagnon, supra.
126. Hess, supra note 111, at 185. (noting that LLR function was deliberately not addressed
by the Concordat). The LLR function is an arrangement requiring host governments to provide
liquidity to financial institutions under stress. Id. LLR functions are generally provided by central
banks. Id. n.12.
127. Cynthia C. Liechtenstein, Introductory Note, Bank for International Settlements:.
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices'Consultative Paperon International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991) [hereinafter
Liechtenstein Introduction].
128. Basle Committee Issues Final Risk-Based CapitalStandards,51 BNA BANKING R'r. 135
(July 25, 1988). See Jeffrey Lowell Quillen, InternationalAttack on Money Laundering:European
Initiatives, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 213,214 (noting that the international money laundering
was also an impetus behind the proposal). In 1988 BIS issued a Statement of Principais on Money
Laundering Practices which developed a five-point plan to establish an code of conduct for central
bank supervisors. Id. at 138; OCC Issues Basle Committee Statement of PrinciplesAgainst Money
Laundering,52 BNA BANIlNG REP. 218 (Jan. 30, 1989).
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Committee distributed a consultative paper, Proposalsfor
InternationalConvergence of CapitalMeasurementsand Capital
Standards,otherwise known as the Basle Proposal. 129 The riskbased capital requirements set forth in the Proposal represented a
substantial increase in the reserve requirements of several
countries, 130 and was very testrictive in defining reduced risk
weighings in capital calculations. 1'' The final draft of the Accord
was completed in July of 1988 after considerable objection. 132 The
Basle Proposal was adopted with little modification despite
dissatisfaction among many Committee nations, 3 notably Japan.
III. THE MODERN FUNCTIONS AND FRAMEWORK

OF THE BIS
As one realizes from the foregoing discussion, the BIS is h
complicated organization. Because the BIS has such a broad purpose,
to promote the cooperation of central banks, 34 a clear definition of
its structure is elusive at best. 35
' This section describes the BIS'
function as the central banks' bank. Further, it explains the formal
structure of the bank, its legal character, and the mechanisms by
which the BIS offers support to the international banking community.

129. Norton, supra note 115, at 1345.
130. Alexander Nicoll, BIS Maps Out a Sounder Base for Banking, LONDON FIlN. TIMES, Dec.
11, 1987, at 34. (indicating that Belgium, France and Japan would clearly be affected as they are
viewed as having the lowest-capitalized banks).
131. Id. See David Lascelles, U.S. Banks Win Rule Change on Capital,LONDON FIN. TIMES,
July 12, 1988, at 44 (noting that U.S. lobbying efforts to broaden the definition of capital under the
Accord prevailed).
132. Lascelles, supra note 131, at 44; Norton, supra note 115, at 1346-47 (highlighting
similarities and differences between the final version and the December 1987 proposal).
133. Liechtenstein Introduction, supra note 127, at 967; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J.
Colletta, Asset Securitization:Evolution, CurrentIssues and New Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REV. 1369,
1413-16 (1991) (discussing the three principal changes) The three changes "are the adoption of new
risk-based capital guidelines, the concomitant uncertainty of achieving sales treatment for purposes
of regulatory accounting principles, and the movement toward lifting Glass-Steagall restrictions on
banks' securities activities. Id at 1413.
134. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose for the creation of the
BIS).
135. Flexible Mystique, supra note 13, at 94 (noting the BIS' role has changed repeatedly over
the years to meet the evolving needs of international banking).
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A. The CentralBanks' Bank
The BIS conducts general banking operations by assisting central
banks in managing and investing reserves. 136 At times, the Bank
1 37
also lends to various countries, central banks, and national banks.
Over eighty of the worlds central banks have deposits with the
BIS. 138 Funds not earmarked for loans to central banks are placed
in highly liquid market investments such as deposits with commercial
banks and purchases
of short-term negotiable paper including
1 39
Treasury bills.
The BIS acts as a lender to the world's central banks in two ways.
First, the BIS makes surplus liquid resources available to member
central banks.'4 Second, the BIS provides bridge financing, acting
as a source of credit for central banks. Recently, bridge financing was
provided in eastern Europe. 141 Additionally,
the bank trades on the
42
foreign exchange and gold markets.
B. Legal Structure
The BIS is unique in that it is organized as a private bank but is
143
owned and operated by the central banks of 29 countries.
Although it is possible for an individual to own stock in the bank

136. A Profile, supra note 1, at 7.
137. Id. See David Buchan, West Ready to Extend FinancialAidfor EastEurope, LONDoN FIN.
TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1989, at 12 (discussing willingness of industrial countries to use IMF to extend aid
to Eastern Europe).
138. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 852.
139. Id.
140. Id. (stating the these funds may be made available in such forms as "swaps against gold;
covered credits secured by means of a pledge of gold or marketable short-term securities; credits
against gold or currency deposits of the same amount and for the same duration held with the BIS;
unsecured credits in the form of advances or deposits; or standby credits, which in individual
instances are backed by guarantees given by member central banks.").
141. Buchan, supra note 137, at 2; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 852.
142. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 852.
143. A Profile, supra note 1, at 2. Those countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. Id.
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(approximately 16 % of the Bank's stock is privately held),' 44 only
bank members may vote their shares. 145 Akin to a standard bank,
the BIS is administered by the Board of Directors, the management,
who choose to exercise their authority at the general
and the members
14 6
meeting.
Currently, there are three segments making up the Board of
Directors. In the first segment, the ex officio directors consist of the
Governors of the central banks of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the United States, 47 and the United Kingdom.' 4 8 Each ex officio
member appoints another member representative of finance, industry
or commerce of the same nationality to serve on the Board. 149 The
final segment consists of not more than nine persons elected by the
Board from the Governors of the central banks of countries in which
shares have been subscribed, but excluding those countries with ex
officio members.'
The power to manage the BIS is vested in the bank President and
the Chairman, both of whom are appointed by the Board. 151
Traditionally, the president is selected from a smaller industrial
country with less interest in international monetary affairs."12
The general meeting is, in essence, an annual meeting of
shareholders and generally takes place on the second Monday in
June. "5The general meeting is distinguishable from a corporate

144. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 849 (stating that the 16 percent represents the whole of the
American issue and almost half of the Belgian and French issues).
145. A Profile, supra note 1, at 2. Chapter II of the Statutes of the Bank for International
Settlements contains no section which excludes private ownership in the shares of the bank. Statutes
of the BIS supra note 17, at 11-14. However, Article 12 does grant the BIS the power to decline to
accept any person as the transferee of a share. Id. at 13.
146. A Profile, supra note 1, at 2.
147. See A Profile, supra note I, at 2 (noting that "the United States does not occupy the two
seats on the Board of Directors to which it is entitled under the Statutes"); Flexible Mystique, supra
note 13, at 95 (indicating that the United States has never occupied its positions on the board in an
attempt to eliminate the political interference of Congress).
148. Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, ch. IV, art. 27, at 17.
149. Id.

150.

Id.

151.
152.

Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, ch, IV, art. 38, at 18-19.
Peter Montagnon, Belgian Elected to Head BIS, LONDON FIN. TtMES, July 11, 1984, at

153.

Id. at 19; A Profile, supra note 1, at 3,

12.
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annual meeting in that the only shareholders permitted to attend are
54
BIS member central banks.1
C. Legal Character
To understand the legal makeup of the BIS it is helpful to
recognize that the Bank has a dual character. 15 5 First, the Bank is
clearly an international organization, with the consequent
international legal personality, privileges, and immunities
56
customarily conferred on intergovernmental organizations. 1
Second, the BIS is also a bank which is capitalized with issued
stock.'"57 The legal structure of the BIS, however, is distinguishable
from general corporate law in that it is controlled by the member
central banks. 5 ' Thus, the BIS is both an international organization
and an international bank.
There are several views as to the legal character of the BIS.159
Prior to World War II, the popular view held that the BIS was a
corporation. 6 ' This interpretation recognized that the BIS was
incorporated under Swiss law, and had certain special, but limited
rights.' 6 ' However, this view seems to be of historic import
only.' 62 A minority of commentators have chosen a more simplistic
view-of the Bank. That is, that the BIS is an association of central

154. Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, ch. V, art. 44, at 19-20.
155. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 845.
156. Id. (pointing out that the BIS has entered into several international treaties) These treaties
included: (1) with France, the United Kingdom & the United States in 1948, Exchange of Letters
Constituting an Agreement, 140 U.N.T.S. 187-95; (2) with Germany in 1953 & 1966, 1953
Bundesgesetzblatt [GBG 1.] 11331,380 (W.Ger.); 1966 GBG1. 11209,436; and (3) the Headquarters
Agreement with Switzerland in 1987, Accord entre le Conseil fdddral suisse et ]a Banque des
R~glements Internationaux en vue de d6terminer le statut juridique de la Banque en Suisse, du 10
fdvrier 1987, Recucil offiiel des lois fcddrales [RO] 8 (Mar. 3, 1987); Systematisehe Sammlung des
Bundesrects [SR] 0.192.122.971.3 (Switz.), reprinted in English in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMNTs, BASic TExTs 29-30, (1989 reprint) (1987).
157. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 845.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 844-45.
160. Id. at 845.
161. Id. (citation omitted).
162. Id. at 845 n.1l (explaining that since World War II, this view has only been upheld by
Sereni).
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banks, so exceptional as to be an organization sui generis.163
Current doctrine suggests that the BIS is an international organization
possessing an international legal personality similar to any
intergovernmental organization, even though its members are not
governments but central banks.6 4
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law offers an additional
way to characterize the BIS. According to the Restatement, "an
organization that is created by an international agreement and has a
membership consisting entirely or principally of states" is, by
definition, an international organization. 5 The BIS would seem to
meet this definition but for the fact that its membership is primarily
composed of the central banks of member states. 66 The comments
to the Restatement distinguish an international organization from an
international public corporation. 67 According to the Restatement,
68
the BIS is considered to be an international public corporation.'
In terms of jurisdiction, the BIS enjoys considerable
independence by and through its 1930 charter.' 69 The Arbitral
Tribunal, established under The Hague Agreements of January 20,
1930, has jurisdiction to hear BIS disputes. 70
' Additionally, the
Bank enjoys immunities pursuant to the Brussels Protocol of
1936.17' However, to ensure its credit standing, the BIS may be
proceeded against, for disputes arising out of its regular banking
operations, in any court of competent jurisdiction and its own assets

163.
164.

Id. at 845 (citations omittcd).
Id. at 84546.

165.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 221 (1987) [hereinafter].

166. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (describing the membership of the BIS).
167. RESTATEMENT, supra note 165 at § 221 cint. d (stating that "states have by agreement
created entities for economic activities, known as 'international public corporations,'
'intergovernmental corporations of private law,' or 'multinational public enterprises.' Unlike
international organizations as here defined, which are governed by international law or agreements,
Comment a, international public corporations are subject to some regimen of private commercial law
or to mixed international and private law.").
168. REsTATEMENT supra note 165, at § 221 n.3.
169. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 847.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 848. For the text of the Protocol Regarding Immunities see art. 4, Protocol
Regarding Immunities, July 30, 1936, 197 L.N.T.S. 30, reprinted in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, BASIC TExTs 25-27, (1989 reprint) (1987).
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(not the assets entrusted to the bank) may be subject to measures of
compulsory execution.' 72
D. Supportfor the InternationalBanking Community
Consistent with its 1930 charter, the BIS promotes cooperation
among central banks by acting as a meeting place for the central bank
Governors of the leading industrialized nations. 73 Pursuant to its
general mandate, the BIS offers a forum for bankers to meet,
contemplate, and discuss the problems affecting international
banking."' The general nature of this function, coupled with the
lavish BIS facilities, has earned the BIS a reputation as "acultured
75
talking shop, with little to show in the way of policy initiatives.
Despite this criticism, concrete policy initiatives have developed
from the BIS meetings. For example, because of discussions at the
BIS meetings, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the
Basle Concordat, the Basle Accord, and several international
supervisory organizations came to life.176 Additionally, the Basle
meetings have offered regular opportunities for exchanges of views
77
among most of the central banks of the OECD countries. 1
Additionally, the meetings offer contacts with over eighty of the
world's central banks including several from
countries of the
17
centrally-planned economies in eastern Europe.
The BIS now provides assistance to the central banks of several
former Easter block countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. Further, the BIS has provided bridging loans
to facilitate IMP credits and pending World Bank financing.' 79 The

172. Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, art. 55, at 25-27; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 851.
173. Constituent Charter, supra note 14, at 3.
174. Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, ch. I, art. 3, at 11; Flexible Mystique, supra note 13,
at 95; A Profile; supra note 1, at 3.
175. Peter Marsh, New East Meets Old West at Central Bankers' Bank, LONDON FIN. TIMES,
July 9, 1991, at 3.
176. See supranotes 113-33 and accompanying text (setting forth the history of the Committee,
Concordat, and Accord).
177. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 853.
178. Id.
179. A Profile, supra note 1, at 2; Buchan, supra note 137, at 2.
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members of the BIS understand that without credit assistance, a
weak-currency country would have little to gain from a venture to
stabilize its exchange rates because of the risks and costs
involved.' Thus, the BIS was instrumental in introducing the
eastern European bankers to the mainstream of the West, but may
have lagged behind the IMF in providing the necessary
assistance.' 8
The Committee on Banking Supervision has been a catalyst to the
creation of other international supervisorial banking
organizations. 182 The Committee has been associated with the
creation of a commission of Latin American and Caribbean banking
and inspection organizations and an organization of banking
83
supervisors from Southeast Asia, New Zealand and Australia.'
E. Administrative Support
In order to comply with the current rules of procedure, 184 the
Committee of Governors reorganized the BIS' internal structure. The
Governors revised working procedures and formed three subcommittees to support the EEC central banks. These committees are
the Foreign Exchange Policy Sub-Committee, the Monetary Policy
Sub-Committee, and the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee.'
In addition to its other roles, the BIS performs secretariat
functions for FECOM,18 6 the Committee of Governors of the EEC
8 A secretariat is the
central banks,"8 7 and the Basle Committee. 18

180.
181.

Works, supra note 21, at 496 (1985).
Marsh, supra note 175, at 2 (suggesting that the BIS has responded with discussion and

little action).
182. Norton, supra note 115, at 1338.
183. Id.
184. A Profile,supra note 1, at 5 (explaining the BIS' mandate is to provide additional support
to the banking members of the European Monetary System).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text (describing FECOM).
187. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (describing the Committee of Governors
of the EEC central banks).
188. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (describing the Committee on Banking

Supervision).
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administrative department of an organization. 9 The fact that the
BIS is seen as a technical organization rather than a political
90
organization emanates largely from its secretariat function.1
As a result of its secretariat function, the BIS is in a position to
influence greatly the decisions of three of the most influential
organizations in the banking community. Additionally, the BIS has
a member on both the Committee of Governors and the Basle
Committee of Banking Supervision (which consists primarily of the
same members that founded the BIS). Thus, the BIS may exert
considerable influence over the organizations to which it serves as
secretariat.
The goals of the BIS require consideration of a great deal of
financial information.' 91 In response, the Monetary and Economic
Department of the BIS conducts research, collects and publishes data
on international banking developments, and runs an intra-central
bank economic data bank. 192 The research department has also
produced: (1) The Cross Report;193 (2) a group of computer
experts; (3) a group of experts on payment systems established by the
central banks of G-10 countries; (4) a group of experts on monetary
and economic data bank questions; and (5) expert assistance to
eastern Europe.1 94 Additionally, the BIS supports its various
committees, study groups, and departments with statistical research,
financial data, and published reports from its Monetary and
Economic Department. Further, the Bank is considered a reporting
center for statistics on international banking. l -

189. CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1330 (7th ed. 1988).
190. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 850 (noting that the modem perception of the BIS is that of
technical and bank oriented rather than political and institutional).
191. A Profile, supra note 1, at 6.
192. Id.
193. The Cross Report is also known as Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations
in International Banking. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 855. See supra note 69 (discussing the events
leading up to the report).
194. Buchan, supra note 137, at 2; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 855.
195. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 855.

863

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 5
F. FiduciarySupport
The agent-trustee function is one of the statutory objectives of the
BIS. 196 In the past, the BIS has acted as an agent during the
following situations: The multilateral payments agreements from
1947 to 1950; the European Payments Union (1950-58); the OECD
Exchange Guarantee Agreement (1972-78); and the Act of Pledge for
secured loans issued by the European Coal and Steel Community
between 1954 and 1961.197 The BIS also acted as agent under the
European Monetary Agreement (EMA) between 1958 and 1972. The
BIS has been the agent for FECOM since the organization's creation
in 1973.198 Since October of 1986, the Bank performed separate
agency functions in connection with the operation of the private ECU
clearing and settlement system. 199 Pursuant to an agreement with
the ECU Banking Association (EBA), the BIS took over
administration from the Mutual ECU Settlement Account (MESA)
banks consisting of Belgium, England, France, Italy, and
Luxembourg.'2
IV. THE FuTRE OF THE BIS
A. An ApparentMove TowardsA CentralBank?
The question of whether the BIS is becoming or has become the
world central bank is of vital interest internationally as well as a
domestically. Analogous to the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States,20' the formation of a world central bank would necessarily

196. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 857 (citations omitted) (noting that an arbitral award resulted
from litigation concerning the administration of the Young and Dawes Loans in 1980) The article
also recognizes that the BIS is aggressively pursuing its ageni/trustee mandate. Id
197. A Profile, supra note 1, at 8; Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 857-58.
198. A Profile, supra note 1, at 8. See notes 75-94 and accompanying text (discussing
FECOM). For an overall accounting of the individual functions the BIS performs as agent of FECOM
and the ECU see Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 860-61.
199. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 858; A Profile, supra,note 1, at 8. See supranotes 85-88 and
accompanying text (discussing ECU).
200. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 861.
201. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 248 (enumerating the powers of the Federal Reserve Board).
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involve banking regulation in areas such as liquidity. Hence,
international interest rates and lending operations would be affected
as a consequence. At least one commentator currently considers the
BIS the "World Central Bank., 20 2 Indeed, the BIS may be at a
juncture in its existence. But, is the BIS already the de facto world
central bank?
The BIS acts as the agent for FECOM, which has been touted as
an embryonic European central bank.20 3 Not only is the BIS the
agent for FECOM, it actually performs FECOM's principal function,
which is the settling of debts among the central banks of member
states.2" 4 Although FECOM is clearly a regional institution
organized by the EEC (as opposed to -the BIS membership which
covers five continents), FECOM is the driving force behind the
creation of a European economic and monetary union, the creation of
a single currency, and a European central bank.20 The BIS is
deeply involved in these developments.20 6 Therefore, the BIS could
appear to be functioning as the European central bank.
In understanding the de facto creation of an international
organization, it is helpful to briefly discuss the concept of soft
law.20 7 Soft law is recognizable by such titles as guidelines or
declarations of principles (e.g., concordats and accords).20 8 The
essential premise for effective soft law is an expectation that the
states accepting these instruments will take their content seriously

202. Stephen Kindel & Amy Barrett, Super Bank, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 5, 1991, at 28.
203. Slow Wriggle, supra note 80, at 51.
204. Id. But see Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844 (stating that the BIS is distinguishable from
FECOM in several respects).
205. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844.
206. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844 n.10 (explaining that the European Council entrusted to
a committee which included the General Manager of the BIS, the task of studying and proposing
concrete stages leading towards the realization of economic and monetary union).
207. See Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983) (providing a discussion of soft law and its impact on international
economies). Four elements tend to explain the concept of soft law: (1) common intent is implicit in
the soft law as formulated and it is this common intent, when elucidated, that is to be respected; (2)
the legitimacy of the soft law as promulgated is not challenged; (3) soft law is not deprived of its
quality as law because failure to observe it is not in itself a breach of obligation; and (4) conduct that
respects soft law cannot be deemed invalid. Id.
208. Id
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and give them some measure of respect.209 It has been strongly
suggested that the soft law which applies to international economic
relationships also applies to exchange arrangements.210 If this is a
viable and prophetic observation, then over time one should expect
the guidelines and declarations set out by the BIS and by the
Committee on Banking Supervision to take the form of positive
international law.21 ' In support of the argument that the BIS is the
de facto world central bank, the BIS has been regulating international
banking as would a world central bank, at least to the extent that the
Concordat and Accord are recognized as affirmative obligations.
A world central bank would require the authority to enforce its
regulations. Currently, there are two examples of the BIS enforcing
its regulations. First, the Basle Accord is an enforceable agreement
(not mere guidelines for cooperation)2 t2 which sets liquidity
standards for international banking.2 13 Under the Accord, the
209. Id. (noting that legal norms can also fall within meaning of soft law if the legal norm is
not absolutely firm).
210. ld. at 444.
211. Gold, supra note 207, at 481. The author cautions the international lawyer not to always
relying on this assumption, since by training, he is a predisposed to find a transformation of soft law
into firm legal obligations. Id. 481-82.
212. Peter C. Hayward, ProspectsforInternationalCooperationby Bank Supervisors,24 INT'L
LAW 787, 790 (1990).
213. Bankfor InternationalSettlements, Committee on Banking Regulationsand Supervisory
Practices' Consultative Paperon InternationalConvergenceof CapitalMeasurement and Capital
Standards,30 I.L.M. 967,994 (1991) (noting that the core capital element must be at least 4 per cent
and stating that the text of the Accord sets a target standard ratio of capital to weighted risk at 8 per
cent, and details a simple definition of capital and risk weights). The paper also sets forth the general
considerations in the index:
I. THE CONSTITUENTS OF CAPITAL
(a) Core capital (basic equity)
(b) Supplementary capital
(i) Undisclosed reserves
(ii) Revaluation reserves
(iii) General provisions/general loan loss reserves
(iv) Hybrid debt capital instruments
(v) Subordinated term debt
(c) Deductions from capital
IL THE RISK WEIGHTS
(i) Categories of risk captures in the framework
(ii) Country transfer risk
(iii) Claims on non-central-goverment, public-sector entities (PSEs)
(iv) Collateral and guarantees
(v) Loans secured on residential property
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Committee on Banking Supervision will continually monitor its
application of the agreement. Additionally, it is the intent of the
national authorities who are parties to the Accord to provide a fixed
basis for promulgating national law or regulation.214 Switzerland
has gone so far as to enforce the Accord judicially, 21 5 the U.S. has
promulgated regulations, 2 6 and the EEC has created positive
obligations under the Second Banking Directive.217
Second, based on the European Communities' plan to develop a
comprehensive program for the financial sector, the EEC's Second

Banking Directive places the Committee on Banking Supervision in
a powerful position regarding capital standards.2"' In essence, the
standards to be adopted by the Community will be set by the
Committee. 219 Thus, Credit Suisse, the United States Federal
Reserve's promulgation of regulations, and the Second Banking

Directive have illustrated that the creation of enforceable law may
merely require unilateral agreement among the members of the BIS.

B. Advantages
There are considerable advantages in establishing the BIS as the
world central bank. As the world central bank, the BIS could
capitalize upon its diverse experiences, practices, and mechanisms.

(vi) Off-balance-sheet engagements).
Id. at 980-84.
214. Hayward, supra note 212, at 791; Liechtenstein Introduction, supra note 127, at 967.
215. Compare William Dullforce, Seeking to Assure Analysts, LONDON FIN. Tms, May 23,
1990, at 28 (stating Credit Suisse's position that the Accord's reserve requirements do not apply to
holding companies) with Liechtenstein Introduction, supranote 127, at 967 (stating that CreditSuisse
lost its case against the Federal Banking Commission and was ordered by the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, Second Public Law Division, to apply the capital rules to the holding company on December
11, 1990).
216. 12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 208, 225 & 325.
217. Liechtenstein Introduction, supra note 127, at 967. See Key, supra note 62, at 591 n.9
(stating that based on the European Communities' plan to develop a comprehensive program for the
financial sector, the Second Banking Directive of the Treaty of Rome places the Committee in a
powerful position regarding capital standards, and that in essence, the standards which will be
adopted by the community will be set by the Committee); George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration
and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARv. Irr'L LJ. 463 (1990) at 466, 466-67.
218. Key, supra note 62, at 591 n.9.
219. Id. Zavvos, supra note 217, at 466.
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Experience is the most important advantage. As has been detailed, the
BIS:
(1) Is world's oldest international financial organization;
(2) has been involved in a considerable list of world banking
problems;
(3) has provided bridge financing in critical economic times
throughout the world, most recently in eastern Europe;
(4) under its Monetary and Economic Department, conducts
research, collects and publishes data on international
banking developments, and runs an intra-central bank
economic data bank;
(5) enjoys a unique relationship with the World Bank, OECD
and has Special Drawing Rights with the IMF;
(6) acts as clearing house for the public and private ECU;
(7) is well positioned to become the European Central Bank
when a central bank is established pursuant to the Treaty
of Rome; and
(8) has, through the Committee on Banking Supervision,
promulgated the Basle Accord which has become an
enforceable standard in world capital markets.
Additionally, one unexplored advantage of the BIS is the
potential of using the dispute resolution mechanism set forth in The
Hague Convention to resolve international banking disputes. For
example, this mechanism could have been used to address the
difficulties encountered by the lack of a lender of last resort in the
Banco Ambrosiano and BCCI cases.22 0
C. A Question of Intent
In light of the preceding discussion, it would certainly appear that
the BIS is the de facto world bank. However, the question remains as
to whether the BIS intends to become the world central bank. This
question has escaped those who currently view the BIS as the de fact
220.

Statutes of the BIS, supra note 17, art. 54, at 22.
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world central bank. Despite the functions performed by the BIS, there
is little to show that its governors ever intended to make it the world
central bank. First, the BIS plays no role in institutionalizing a
monetary order; therefore, the creation of a European central bank
and a single currency are objectives which are completely alien to
it.221 Second, although the BIS performs the clearing house
function of the ECU (both public and private), its governors hesitated
for years at the prospect of accepting the responsibility.222 Finally,
In order for the BIS to become the world central bank it would have
to alter its fundamental purpose.
The BIS' purpose is to act as a forum for the exchange of
information. The Bank is located in Basle, a considerable distance
from any nation's capital, to avoid political pressures. 223 The
United States supported the political independence of the BIS by
refusing to fill the two seats on the Board of Directors to which it is
entitled under the BIS statutes.224 Thus, the power to regulate
banking would in effect politicize the Bank, a result that the founders
hoped to avoid.
The actions of the BIS alone should not be interpreted as an
attempt to become the world central bank. To become the world
central bank, the Committee and the general membership must
resolve to accept this responsibility. In the past, the BIS has been
reluctant to accept additional responsibility. 225 Although it has been
pointed out that the BIS "is not concerned with establishing.., a set
of rules to govern the international monetary system... ,,226 the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision seems to do just that.

221. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 844.
222. Linnebank, supra note 87.
223. Flexible Mystique, supra note 13, at 95 (stating that the BIS was located in Basle, far from
the political pressures of any national capital).
224. See supra note 147 (explaining that the United States' seats on the Board of Governors
of the BIS are vacant).
225. Linnebank, supra note 87.
226. Giovanoli, supra note 15, at 843.
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V. CONCLUSION

Has the BIS shed its low profile? To some extent it has not. The
inner workings of the BIS remain mysterious. Bank governors seem
to come and go under a cloak of secrecy. Yet, the actions of the BIS
are no longer passive and reactive. The BIS has de facto control over
the Committee on Banking Supervision through its secretariat
function, and the bank's Board of Governors is virtually identical to
the membership of that Committee. The advent of the Committee on
Banking Supervision changed the BIS from its predominantly
reactive posture to a position of leadership in the international
banking community. The ever increasing involvement of the
Committee suggests that this change has been taking place over the
last decade. 227 However, the Bank's move away from a low profile
position is not tantamount to a move towards becoming the world
central bank. It merely means that the Bank is exercising its paternal
obligation in a more productive manner.
Although the BIS has been criticized as being a cultured talking
shop, it has afforded the world banking community a politically
neutral forum to discuss banking issues.228 Moreover, the BIS has
provided the swing financing necessary to avoid several major
banking crises. 22 9 This would not have been possible if the
institution would have been subject to the command of central
governments as opposed to central banks.
Much has changed since the formation of the BIS. The
internationalization of financial markets, the vast expansion of capital
markets, and the widespread lack of bank supervision has led to
major bank failures during the last three decades. These events have
compelled the BIS to take actions which appear inconsistent with a

227.

See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (setting forth the history of the Committee,

Concordat, and Accord).
228. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of the BIS).
229. See e.g., note 137 (noting the Eastern European example); Basle is back: the Controversy
over IMF Gold Sales has Pushed the BIS back into the Headlines,ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1976, at 87
(describing the role the BIS played in bolstering the economy of the United Kingdom in 1961 by
providing assistance of $900 million).
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low profile. In short, it is not possible to maintain a low profile in
today's complex and high-tech international banking environment.
Although the BIS is in a unique position to bring together the
European banking community as well as the world banking
community, the move is neither compelling nor prudent. The BIS
Governors are most certainly aware that the BIS best serves world
banking interests by virtue of its flexibility. This flexibility emanates
from the discretion the bank possesses; unfettered by political
baggage.
In essence, many have failed to understand the place the BIS
occupies in world financial circles. The BIS gives the world banking
community a free forum for expressing concerns regarding financial
stability. Its members, though regulators themselves, should be
reluctant to relinquish the regulatory powers they now possess in
order to establish a universal regime subject to the political forces of
national self interest.
G. Boyd Tarin

